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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
______________ 
 
No.  11-4523 
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v. 
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                                       Appellant 
______________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D. C. No. 06-cr-00029) 
District Judge:  Honorable Kim R. Gibson 
_______________________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
October 23, 2012 
 
Before:  HARDIMAN, GREENAWAY, JR., and 
VANASKIE, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Opinion Filed:  January 9, 2013) 
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Donovan J. Cocas 
Stephanie L. Haines 
Rebecca R. Haywood 
Office of United States Attorney 
700 Grant Street 
Suite 4000 
Pittsburgh, PA 15219-0000 
 Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellee 
 
Chris R. Eyster 
Suite 304 
100 Ross Street 
Pittsburgh, PA 15219-2013 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
 
___________________________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________________________ 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
Kelly Huff appeals the District Court’s judgment of 
sentence following the revocation of her supervised release.  
Huff contends that her sentence of ten months’ incarceration 
was substantively unreasonable.  Because Huff was 
unconditionally released from custody on August 31, 2012, we 
will dismiss her appeal as moot. 
I 
In July 2008, Huff pleaded guilty to conspiracy to 
distribute 50 grams or more of cocaine base and 500 grams or 
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more of powder cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846.  The 
District Court sentenced her to twelve months’ imprisonment to 
be followed by three years of supervised release.  Because Huff 
already had spent more than a year in prison while awaiting 
trial, her period of supervised release began on July 22, 2008. 
In August 2010, the United States Probation Office filed 
a Petition on Supervised Release in which it informed the 
District Court that Huff had violated the conditions of her 
supervised release by failing to attend mental health treatment, 
failing to notify the Probation Office about contact with law 
enforcement, and failing to file monthly supervision reports for 
four consecutive months.  Huff waived a hearing and agreed to 
be placed in home detention for three months, and the court 
entered an order to that effect. 
In April 2011, the Probation Office filed a second 
Petition on Supervised Release after Huff was charged with 
driving under the influence, endangering the welfare of children, 
improper vehicle child restraint, public drunkenness, and failure 
to stop at a red light.  The Petition also stated that Huff had been 
non-compliant with other aspects of the terms of her 
supervision. 
On December 6, 2011, the District Court held a hearing 
to consider the alleged violations, which Huff conceded.  Huff 
and her counsel urged the Court to impose home supervision so 
Huff could continue to care for her two children.  Citing Huff’s 
continued inability or unwillingness to comply with the 
conditions of her supervision, the District Court denied Huff’s 
request for leniency.  Instead, the District Court revoked Huff’s 
supervised release and sentenced her to ten months’ 
incarceration with no subsequent period of supervised release. 
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Huff filed a notice of appeal on December 7, 2011.  She 
argues that her sentence was substantively unreasonable.  
Significantly, however, Huff was released from custody on 
August 31, 2012. 
II 
We begin, as we always do, with the question of 
jurisdiction.  The federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, 
Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 
(1994), and our power to render judgment is circumscribed by 
the Article III requirement that a live case or controversy exist 
throughout all stages of litigation, including appellate review, 
see U.S. Const. art. III, § 2; Lewis v. Cont’l Bank Corp., 494 
U.S. 472, 477 (1990).  This requirement is satisfied when the 
parties “continue to have a ‘personal stake in the outcome’ of 
the lawsuit.”  Lewis, 494 U.S. at 478 (quoting Los Angeles v. 
Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101 (1983)).  When the parties lose their 
personal stake in the outcome, the case becomes moot and must 
be dismissed, even if it once was a live controversy at an earlier 
stage of the proceedings.  See Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 732–
33 (2008). 
If Huff were still serving her ten-month sentence, or if 
she were still subject to a term of supervised release, no 
mootness concerns would exist.  See Spencer v. Kemna, 523 
U.S. 1, 7 (1998); United States v. Jackson, 523 F.3d 234, 241 
(3d Cir. 2008) (“[I]f a defendant who is serving a term of 
supervised release elects to challenge only his sentence of 
supervised release, he has raised a live case or controversy under 
Article III such that a court will have jurisdiction over his 
appeal.”).  But “[o]nce the convict’s sentence has expired . . . 
some concrete and continuing injury other than the now-ended 
incarceration or parole—some ‘collateral consequence’ of the 
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conviction—must exist if the suit is to be maintained.”  Spencer, 
523 U.S. at 7; see also United States v. Kissinger, 309 F.3d 179, 
181 (3d Cir. 2002) (“[O]nce a litigant is unconditionally 
released from criminal confinement, the litigant must prove that 
he or she suffers a continuing injury from the collateral 
consequences attaching to the challenged act.”). 
In Sibron v. New York, the Supreme Court carved a 
narrow exception to this rule by allowing the presumption of 
collateral consequences when a litigant challenges a criminal 
conviction.  392 U.S. 40, 55–56 (1968).  However, in Spencer v. 
Kemna, the Court held that Sibron’s presumption of collateral 
consequences does not apply to parole revocations.  523 U.S. at 
12.  Likewise, in United States v. Kissinger, we extended 
Spencer to an appeal involving a probation violation because we 
could discern no “distinction between parole and probation that 
would justify distinguishing Spencer.”  309 F.3d at 181.  In the 
years since Kissinger, panels of our Court extended Spencer to 
revocations of supervised release,1
                                                 
1 See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 373 F. App’x 186, 
187 (3d Cir. 2010); United States v. Ebersole, 263 F. App’x 251, 
254 & n.5 (3d Cir. 2008); United States v. Robinson, 39 F. 
App’x 723, 725 (3d Cir. 2002); see also United States v. 
McHugh, 389 F. App’x 127, 131 (3d Cir. 2010) (applying 
Spencer and Kissinger to the supervised release context without 
discussion); United States v. Simmons, 353 F. App’x 689, 690 
(3d Cir. 2009) (applying Kissinger without discussion). 
 and we suggested in dicta in 
United States v. Jackson that Spencer applied in this context, see 
Jackson, 523 F.3d at 238, 241.  Today, we hold precedentially 
that Sibron’s presumption of collateral consequences does not 
apply to supervised release revocations.  Accordingly, consistent 
with Spencer, a litigant who is unconditionally released from 
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custody must show that she will, in fact, suffer collateral 
consequences from the supervised release revocation to present 
a live case or controversy. 
This conclusion follows from our holding in Kissinger, 
from the rulings of our sister circuits, and from Congress’s 
intent in replacing the parole regime with supervised release.  In 
Kissinger, we implied that Spencer may be applied to 
revocations of supervised release because we acknowledged and 
relied upon decisions of other courts of appeals that applied 
Spencer in that context.  See Kissinger, 309 F.3d at 181; see also 
United States v. Meyers, 200 F.3d 715, 721 n.2 (10th Cir. 2000) 
(“This court can discern no relevant differences between parole 
and supervised release which would militate against the 
applicability of Spencer.”); United States v. Clark, 193 F.3d 
845, 847–48 (5th Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (applying Spencer and 
dismissing as moot a challenge to the district court’s extension 
of supervised release); United States v. Probber, 170 F.3d 345, 
348–49 (2d Cir. 1999) (applying Spencer and dismissing as 
moot a challenge to the revocation of supervised release).  
Subsequently, other courts of appeals also have concluded that 
Spencer extends to supervised release revocations.  See, e.g., 
United States v. Hardy, 545 F.3d 280, 284 (4th Cir. 2008); 
United States v. Duclos, 382 F.3d 62, 66 (1st Cir. 2004). 
In Kissinger, we also discussed the similarities between 
probation and supervised release, including the fact that both are 
imposed by the judiciary, see 18 U.S.C. § 3583(a) (supervised 
release); 18 U.S.C. § 3565(a) (probation), revocation in both 
contexts is heard by the judiciary, see 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) 
(supervised release); 18 U.S.C. § 3565(a)(2) (probation), and the 
conditions the judiciary is permitted to impose are identical for 
probation and supervised release, see United States v. Evans, 
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155 F.3d 245, 250–51 (3d Cir. 1998) (comparing 18 U.S.C. § 
3563(b) (probation), with 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) (supervised 
release)).  Kissinger, 309 F.3d at 181. 
Finally, extending Spencer’s rule from the parole context 
to the supervised release context makes sense in light of 
Congress’s decision to “eliminate[] most forms of parole in 
favor of supervised release” in the Sentencing Reform Act of 
1984.  Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 696–97 (2000); 
see also Gozlon-Peretz v. United States, 498 U.S. 395, 400 
(1991). 
* * * 
In sum, we agree with our sister courts of appeals that 
collateral consequences should not be presumed in cases, such 
as this one, that challenge revocations of supervised release.  
Huff has not argued that she will, in fact, suffer any collateral 
consequences.  It follows, therefore, that Huff’s unconditional 
release from prison renders this case moot.  Accordingly, we 
must dismiss her appeal for lack of jurisdiction. 
